We present an international trade model with multiproduct …rms. Firms are heterogeneously endowed with two types of capabilities that jointly determine the trade-o¤ within …rms between managing a large portfolio of products and producing at low marginal cost. The model can explain many of the documented crosssectional correlations in …rm performance measures, including why larger …rms are more productive and more diversi…ed, and yet more diversi…ed …rms trade at a discount. Globalization is shown to induce heterogeneous responses across …rms in terms of scope and productivity, some of which are consistent with existing empirical work, while others are potentially testable.
Introduction
Multiproduct …rms dominate domestic and international commerce: they account for 91% of U.S. manufacturing sales (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2010 ) and 98% of the value of U.S. manufacturing exports (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2007) . The empirical literature has documented many dimensions along which multiproduct …rms di¤er in their performance from single-product …rms. On average, multiproduct …rms are larger than single-product …rms (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006) as well as more productive (Schoar, 2002 ). Yet …nancial markets tend to discount …rm diversi…ca-tion: diversi…ed …rms exhibit, on average, lower market valuations relative to their book valuations than less diversi…ed …rms (Lang and Stulz, 1994) .
Why is it that …rms that manage a large number of products tend to have a low market-to-book ratio despite being more productive on average? More generally, what underlying mechanisms can generate the broad (and sometimes seemingly contradictory) range of cross-sectional correlations in …rm performance measures? What is the likely impact of a major economic shock such as globalization on these correlations?
To address these questions, we extend the Melitz (2003) model in two directions.
First, we allow each …rm to choose the number of its products which involves an irrecoverable …xed cost per product. Second, we assume that …rms are heterogeneously endowed with two types of capabilities, organizational capital and organizational e¢ ciency. Organizational capital is a necessary (intangible) input into the production of each product managed by the …rm. The more organizational capital is used in the production of a given product, the lower is that product's marginal cost. Because organizational capital is in …xed supply within the …rm, the …rm faces a trade-o¤ between o¤ering more products and producing each product at lower marginal cost (or, equivalently, higher total factor productivity). A …rm's organizational e¢ ciency determines the severity of that trade-o¤: the higher is a …rm's organizational e¢ ciency, the more e¤ective is organizational capital in reducing the …rm's marginal cost for a given product, and thus the higher the opportunity cost of adding an additional product.
We characterize …rms' equilibrium choices of …rm scope, scale, and export status as a function of their two-dimensional types. This allows us to derive a number of analytical predictions on the cross-sectional correlations of …rm performance measures.
We show that a …rm's endowment of organizational e¢ ciency uniquely determines the …rm's optimal ratio of organizational capital to its (endogenous) number of products and that this ratio is independent of the …rm's endowment of organizational capital.
As a …rm's TFP depends only on that ratio as well as on its organizational e¢ ciency, and positively so, this implies that a …rm's equilibrium equilibrium level of TFP is increasing in its organizational e¢ ciency but independent of its organizational capital.
Among …rms of a given size, there is co-existence of …rms with few products but high TFP and …rms with many products but low TFP. The model can therefore explain the "diversi…cation discount puzzle:" holding …rm size …xed, more diversi…ed …rms have a lower ratio of market to book value (Schoar, 2002) . We also establish a condition on the distribution of organizational capital and organizational e¢ ciency in the population of …rms that implies a positive relationship between …rm size and TFP, as found in the data (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2013) . Similar to Melitz (2003) , a …rm chooses to export if and only if its organizational e¢ ciency is above a certain cuto¤, which is independent of the …rm's organizational capital.
A parameterized version of the model can simultaneously explain several more of the cross-sectional correlations in …rm performance measures that have emerged as key stylized facts from the empirical literature. First, TFP and market-to-book ratio are positively correlated in the cross-section of …rms (Schoar, 2002) . Second, there is a positive cross-sectional correlation between the number of products a …rm manages and the sales per product (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006) . Third, exporters are on average larger than non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 1999 ) but that correlation is far from perfect (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2011) . Fourth, exporters sell on average more products than non-exporters (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2007) .
In response to a bilateral trade liberalization, our model generates a heterogeneous response by …rms. The induced change in the number of products managed is continuous in the size of the trade liberalization for both continuing exporters and continuing nonexporters but it is of opposite sign: continuing exporters increase their diversi…cation while …rms that continue to sell only domestically decrease their diversi…cation. Firms that are induced to switch to exporting choose to drop the number of their products discontinuously so as to become leaner and meaner in the international market place.
The implied TFP response by …rms is consistent with Schoar (2002) who shows that an increase in the level of diversi…cation of U.S. …rms tends to be associated with a reduction in the TFP of incumbent plants. Interestingly, our model predicts that the implied response in the market-to-book ratio may be of the opposite sign to that of the implied TFP response.
In the parameterized version of the model, we show that a trade liberalization gen- With the exception of Dhingra (forthcoming), in these papers …rms draw a distribution of marginal costs (or, equivalently, product-speci…c preference parameters) for various products of di¤erent degrees of substitutability so that the marginal cost of any given product is exogenous. In doing so, these papers focus on the within-…rm distribution of marginal costs. Only low marginal cost products are exported, and trade liberalization induces …rms to shed weaker products to "focus on their core competencies."Instead, we abstract from within-…rm heterogeneity in order to explore a rather di¤erent mechanism, namely one where a …rm's marginal cost for any given product depends on how the …rm solves the trade-o¤ between product proliferation and specialization, and …rms di¤er in the extent of this trade-o¤. This allows us to explain additional features of the data such as the diversi…cation discount and the heterogeneous response of …rms to a trade liberalization. Dhingra (forthcoming) di¤ers from the above-mentioned papers in that, in her model, marginal costs are endogenous as …rms can reduce their marginal costs by investing in process innovation. In contrast to our model, the scope of a …rm is determined by the internalization of demand-side externalities ("cannibalization") at the …rm level. This implies that, as in our model, a trade liberalization will generate di¤erent responses by di¤erent …rms. However, as the mechanism relies on demandside cannibalization, the model does not directly relate to the empirical literature on multiproduct …rms as that literature is using data at a level of aggregation at which demand-side linkages are arguably negligible. 1 In contrast to Dhingra (forthcoming), we explain why larger …rms are more productive in terms of TFP and also more diversi…ed, and yet more diversi…ed …rms trade at a discount.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we set out the closed economy model. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium in the closed economy and show how di¤erent …rms solve the trade-o¤ between diversi…cation and TFP di¤erently.
We analyze how equilibrium …rm performance measures change with changes in a …rm's organizational capital and organizational e¢ ciency. We also demonstrate that the model gives rise to a diversi…cation discount when controlling for …rm size. In Section 4, we embed the model in an international trade setting with two identical countries. We characterize …rms' exporting decisions as a function of their organizational e¢ ciency and organizational capital. Further, we analyze the e¤ects of globalization on …rms' performance measures. The section closes with a numerical analysis of a parameterized version of the model. We conclude in Section 5.
1 For instance, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) work with data disaggregated to the 5-digit SIC or about 1,500 products.
The Closed Economy Model
We consider a discrete-time, in…nite horizon model of a closed economy with a single (di¤erentiated goods) sector and a single factor of production (labor). There is a mass L of identical consumers (workers) with a per-period CES utility function:
where x s (!) is consumption of product ! 2 in period s, and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between products. Products cannot be stored and there is no savings technology.
In each period, each worker supplies a single unit of labor. The economy-wide wage rate in period s is w s 1 and serves as numéraire. Aggregate per-period income is thus equal to L. The resulting aggregate demand for product ! in period s is given by
where p s (!) is the price of product ! in period s and
In each period, there is a su¢ ciently large mass of atomless and ex ante identical potential entrants. If a potential entrant decides not to enter, it obtains a pro…t of zero; if it does decide to enter, the …rm has to incur an irrecoverable setup cost F e .
A fraction F=F e 2 (0; 1] of this entry cost is used to build …rm-speci…c (but perfectly durable) capital equipment for which there is no resale market; the remaining fraction
is spent on intangibles (e.g., advice, know how). Upon entry, the …rm receives a random draw of its time-invariant type ( e ; K) from a continuous distribution function e G with associated density e g and support (0; 1=( 1)) [1; 1). A …rm's type ( e ; K) consists of two elements: its organizational e¢ ciency e and its organizational capital K.
We think of 'organizational capital'and 'organizational e¢ ciency'as being two types of …rm capabilities that cannot be bought 'o¤ the shelf.' 2 In our model, organizational capital is akin to a managerial input that is in …xed supply within the …rm: the more of it is allocated to the production of one product, the less can be allocated to the production of another. Increasing the allocation of organizational capital to a given product allows the …rm to produce that product at lower marginal cost. The rate at which an increase in organizational capital reduces marginal cost is what we call organizational e¢ ciency.
Firms are heterogeneous both in their endowment of organizational capital as well as in their organizational e¢ ciency.
After learning its type, the entrant has to decide on the size of its product portfolio:
for each of the N products it chooses to manage, the …rm has to incur an irrecoverable one-time development cost f to build …rm-product-speci…c (but perfectly durable) capital equipment. In each period, the …rm has also to incur a constant labor cost per unit of output. The marginal cost of product !, denoted c(!; k ! ; e ), is decreasing in the amount of organizational capital, k ! , that the …rm chooses to spend on the product:
1 otherwise, where z > 0 is a cost parameter that is common to all …rms and products. 3 The …rm faces the following resource constraint on the allocation of its organizational capital:
where I is the set of products managed by the …rm. That is, the …rm's allocation of organizational capital over all of its products cannot exceed its endowment of organizational capital. 2 According to the literature on organizational capital (e.g., Prescott and Visscher, 1980; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005) , a key source of a …rm's value lies in the 'architecture'of its organization, originating in "some framework of rules, routines, and tacit understandings that evolved over time" (Sutton, 2012, p. 12). 3 The restriction k ! 1 ensures that, holding the allocation of organizational capital to product ! …xed, an increase in organizational e¢ ciency (weakly) reduces the marginal cost of that product.
At the end of each period, an active …rm (including its assets) dies with probability 1 2 (0; 1) and survives with the remaining probability . For notational simplicity, there is no discounting (i.e., the discount factor is equal to one).
The sequence of moves in each period is as follows:
1. Potential entrants decide whether or not to enter the market.
2. Each new entrant decides how many products to manage and how much organizational capital to spend on each of them.
3. Each active …rm (new entrant or surviving incumbent) sets the prices of its various products so as to maximize its pro…t. Pro…ts are realized.
4. Each active …rm dies with probability 1 .
The Closed Economy: Analysis
In this section, we …rst derive the (stationary) equilibrium in the closed economy. We then analyze the implied cross-sectional correlations in …rm performance measures. We provide conditions under which there is a positive cross-sectional correlation between total factor productivity (TFP) on the one hand and …rm size and market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q) on the other. We also show that the model predicts a size premium when controlling for …rm scope, and a diversi…cation discount when controlling for …rm size.
Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
We solve for the equilibrium backwards. For notational convenience, it will prove useful to use the following monotonic transformation of managerial e¢ ciency: e ( 1). We will henceforth refer to as the …rm's organizational e¢ ciency, and to ( ; K) as the …rm's type, with associated distribution function G and density g on support (0; 1) [1; 1).
Consider …rst …rms' pricing decisions at stage 3. As each …rm faces an iso-elastic demand function, given by (1), each …rm optimally charges a constant markup over marginal cost for each one of its products. For a …rm with organizational e¢ ciency that has previously allocated k ! units of organizational capital to product !, the pro…t-maximizing price of that product is therefore given by
We now turn to …rms'choice of scope at stage 2. Let N ( ; K) denote the number of products managed by a …rm of type ( ; K).
The following lemma shows that a …rm of type ( ; K) optimally allocates the same amount of organizational capital to each one of the N ( ; K) products it chooses to manage:
Lemma 1 A …rm of type ( ; K) chooses to manage no more than K products, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma implies that the marginal cost of a …rm of type ( ; K) is given by
so that the …rm optimally chooses to charge price
The …rm's per-period pro…t (gross of the sunk entry and product development costs) is given by
where
and M is the mass of entrants in each period, and M=(1 ) the mass of active …rms.
As is proportional to A, we will henceforth (with a slight abuse of language) refer to as to the markup-adjusted residual demand level.
Having sunk the entry and product development costs, an active …rm's (market)
value, v( ; K), is the expected sum of future pro…ts, i.e.,
where the second equality follows from (3).
For simplicity, we will in the following focus on the case where > 1. It is straightforward to show that this assumption holds in equilibrium if the entry cost F e is su¢ ciently large. Moreover, we will be abstracting from the integer constraints on the number of products so that N can take the value of any nonnegative real number.
By setting N arbitrarily small, and thus K=N arbitarily large, a …rm can achieve arbitrarily low marginal cost, no matter what its type. This implies that the market value of a …rm of type ( ; K) exceeds the (sunk) development costs of its N ( ; K) products:
As there are no other …xed costs, this implies that all entrants choose to be active. The …rm's problem of choice of scope consists in choosing N so as to maximize its subsequent market value net of the product development costs:
where the …rst term is the expected sum of future pro…ts, conditional on having chosen to manage N products (see equation (6)), and the second term the cost of developing N products.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem:
In equilibrium, a …rm of type ( ; K) chooses to manage
products, where ( 1)= 2 (0; 1).
The proposition shows that the equilibrium number of products, N ( ; K), is proportional to the …rm's organizational capital, K, independent of its organizational e¢ ciency for < , and strictly decreasing in for > (see the proof of the proposition). To understand why, consider the …rst-order condition to program (7): "
The …rst term on the LHS is the net pro…t of the marginal product, whereas the second term is the e¤ect that the marginal product has on the total production costs of the N inframarginal products. Abstracting from the corner solution (N = K), the optimal number of products is achieved where these two e¤ects balance each other. Note that organizational capital a¤ects this trade-o¤ only through the ratio K=N (the organizational capital per product). Hence, there is a uniquely optimal ratio K=N , which is increasing in organizational e¢ ciency . As a result, the optimal number of products is proportional to organizational capital K and (weakly) decreasing in organizational e¢ ciency .
Finally, we consider …rms'entry decisions at stage 1. Since potential entrants are ex ante identical, free entry implies that they must be indi¤erent between entering and not:
is the value of an entrant of type ( ; K) after incurring the (type-independent) irrecoverable entry cost F e but before incurring the irrecoverable product development costs.
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that
The LHS of this equation is labor supply. The …rst term on the RHS is labor demand for production from the mass M=(1 ) of active …rms: a …rm of type ( ; K) sells Ap( ; K) units per product, resulting in labor demand of Ap( ; K) c( ; K) for each of its N ( ; K) products. The second term on the RHS is labor demand from the mass M of entrants for product development and setup. Using equation (5), the labor market clearing condition simpli…es to
Note that this equation implies that, in equilibrium, the mass M of entrants is proportional to the size of the economy, L.
An equilibrium in the closed economy is given by the collection fN ( ; ); p( ; ); M; g satisfying equations (2)- (5) and (8)- (10).
Cross-Sectional Correlation in Firm Performance Measures
We now investigate how various measures of …rm performance -such as pro…t, sales, marginal cost, and Tobin's Q -vary with …rm type in equilibrium.
Inserting (8) into (3), we can rewrite the per-period pro…t of a …rm of type ( ; K) as
the …rm's organizational e¢ ciency : @ ( ; K)=@ = 0 for 2 (0; ), @ ( ; K)=@ < 0 for 2 ; and @ ( ; K)=@ > 0 for 2 ; 1 . 4 At …rst, it may seem surprising that per-period pro…t is decreasing in managerial e¢ ciency on ; . To understand this, recall that the per-period pro…t does not take into account any previously incurred sunk costs. Indeed, as we have seen above, holding organizational capital …xed, a …rm endowed with greater managerial e¢ ciency > optimally chooses to manage a smaller number of products, thus sinking a smaller amount of product development costs. It is straightforward to show that, from an ex ante point of view, being endowed with greater managerial e¢ ciency is better for the …rm: the value of an entrant, v e ( ; K), is continuous and weakly increasing everywhere in (and strictly so for > ), holding K …xed.
The standard measure of …rm size is …rm sales (over all of the …rm's products).
As …rms charge a …xed markup, per-period sales are proportional to per-period pro…t: (11), …rm sales can thus be written as
As …rm sales are proportional to …rm pro…t, the e¤ects of changes in and K on S( ; K) mirror those on ( ; K).
Let us now turn to measures of …rm productivity. One such measure is the …rm's total factor productivity (TFP). As the entry cost F e and the per-product development 4 Note that
We have ( ) = 1, ( ) > 0 for su¢ ciently close to 1, and cost f are sunk, TFP is equal to the inverse of marginal cost, which in turn is given by
TFP is thus independent of the …rm's endowment of organizational capital K, and increasing in the …rm's organizational e¢ ciency for > (and independent of for < ).
Recall that the market value of a …rm is the sum of expected future pro…ts, v( ; K) = ( ; K)=(1 ). Whereas the market value is thus forward looking, the book value is backward looking and equal to the …rm's historic expenditure on capital equipment (or, equivalently, its replacement cost):
The market-to-book ratio of a …rm of type ( ; K) -Tobin's Q -is thus given by
It can easily be veri…ed that Q( ; K) is strictly increasing in the …rm's endowment of organizational capital, K. Holding K …xed, Q( ; K) is independent of for < , and strictly increasing in organizational e¢ ciency for su¢ ciently close to one. However,
for intermediate values of , the market-to-book ratio Q( ; K) may be increasing or decreasing in , depending on parameter values.
The empirical literature has shown that there is a tendency for larger …rms to have higher TFP than smaller …rms (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2013) and that …rms with higher TFP also exhibit a larger market-to-book ratio (Schoar, 2002 ).
In our model, a …rm's TFP is independent of organizational capital K and (weakly) increasing in organizational e¢ ciency , …rm size is increasing in K but non-monotonic in , whereas the market-to-book ratio is increasing in K but not increasing everywhere in . So, intuitively, one might expect that our model generates the cross-sectional correlations between TFP and …rm size and between TFP and Tobin's Q found in the data if there is a su¢ ciently strong positive correlation between K and . Proposition 2 below formalizes this intuition for the case where the distribution of …rm types can be characterized by an ordered pair ( ; K( )):
Proposition 2 Suppose that the distribution of …rm types could be characterized as an ordered pair ( ; K( )). Assume that the elasticity of K with respect to , ( )
where ( ) < 1. Then:
1. Marginal cost c( ; K( )) is (weakly) decreasing and …rm sales S( ; K( )) increasing in for all 2 (0; 1). That is, there is a positive cross-sectional correlation between TFP and …rm size.
2. Marginal cost c( ; K( )) is (weakly) decreasing and Tobin's Q( ; K( )) increasing in for all 2 (0; 1). That is, there is a positive cross-sectional correlation between TFP and the market-to-book ratio.
The empirical literature has established that larger …rms tend to be more productive in terms of TFP (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2013) and more diversi…ed in terms of the number of products they manage (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006).
At …rst glance, these results may seem to be at odds with a very well known …nding in the corporate …nance literature -the diversi…cation discount puzzle (Lang and Stulz, 1994), according to which more diversi…ed …rms tend to be less productive in terms of Tobin's Q. The diversi…cation discount holds, in particular, when controlling for …rm size (Schoar, 2002) . 5 The following proposition shows that these seemingly contradictory empirical …nd-ings are consistent with each other. Our model can not only account for the observed correlations between TFP and size and between TFP and Tobin's Q but it predicts a size premium when controlling for diversi…cation and a diversi…cation discount when controlling for …rm size:
Proposition 3 Holding diversi…cation N ( ; K) …xed, there is a positive cross-sectional relationship between …rm size S( ; K) and the market-to-book ratio Q( ; K). Holding …rm size S( ; K) …xed, there is a negative cross-sectional relationship between …rm scope N ( ; K) and the market-to-book ratio Q( ; K).
To understand why our model predicts a size premium, holding diversi…cation …xed, suppose two …rms optimally choose the same number of products but one …rm is larger than the other in terms of sales. Then, it has to be the case that both …rms have the same book value but that the larger …rm has higher TFP and therefore a higher market value. To understand why our model predicts a diversi…cation discount, holding …rm size …xed, suppose two …rms are of the same size but one …rm chooses to manage a larger number of products than the other. Then, it has to be the case that both …rms have the same market value (which is proportional to …rm size) but that the more diversi…ed …rm had to have made a larger investment in product-speci…c capital in the past and therefore has a larger book value. 5 Several explanations of the diversi…cation discount puzzle have been proposed in the corporate …nance literature. For instance, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) provide an explanation based on agency costs that result in the misallocation of resources across divisions. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) argue that the diversi…cation discount puzzle can better be explained by comparative advantage across sectors. There are also some who argue that the diversi…cation discount may in fact be a statistical artifact of selection (Villalonga, 2004 ).
The Open Economy
In this section, we extend the model to incorporate a simple trading environment between two identical countries, home and foreign. We …rst derive the equilibrium and various When choosing at stage 2 how many products to manage, a new entrant also decides for each of its products whether to sell it only domestically or both domestically and abroad. If it chooses to export any particular product, the entrant must incur at that stage a one-time irrecoverable cost of f x to set up a …rm-product-speci…c distribution system. At stage 3, …rms have to pay an iceberg-type trading cost > 1 for each unit shipped to the foreign market.
Equilibrium in the Open Economy
As in the closed economy, the pro…t-maximizing price of a …rm of type ( ; K) that has allocated k ! units of organizational capital to product ! involves a constant markup over marginal cost: the …rm's domestic price is p(!; k ! ; ) = ( =( 1)) c(!; k ! ; ) whereas the price charged abroad (in case the …rm chooses to serve that market) is p (!; k ! ; ) = p(!; k ! ; ), re ‡ecting the higher cost of serving the foreign market.
Turning to the allocation of organizational capital and export decisions, the following lemma provides a preliminary result:
Lemma 2 A …rm of type ( ; K) chooses to manage no more than K products, i.e., N ( ; K) K. Generically, it exports all of its products, denoted x ( ; K) = 1, or none,
In either case, the …rm allocates the same amount k ! = K=N ( ; K) of its organizational capital to each one of its N ( ; K) products.
It follows from this lemma that all of the N ( ; K) products of …rm ( ; K) have the same marginal cost,
so that the …rm optimally charges price
for all of its products in the domestic market, and -provided the …rm chooses to export
for all of its products in the foreign market. The …rm's stage-2 problem of choice of scope, allocation of organizational capital, and export status therefore simpli…es to
where ( 1) is a measure of trade freeness.
To avoid a taxonomy of cases, we impose in the following (as in the closed economy case) an implicit restriction on parameters such that the markup-adjusted residual demand level , de…ned as before in (4), satis…es
Given this assumption, the following proposition states the solution to program (20) :
In the equilibrium of the open economy, the export decision of a …rm of type ( ; K) is given by
The …rm's equilibrium number of products is
Proposition 4 demonstrates that a …rm's export decision is independent of its organizational capital K, depending only on its organizational e¢ ciency : a …rm chooses to export, x ( ; K) = 1, if and only if > x . The reason why a …rm's endowment of organizational capital does not a¤ect its export decision is that the only …xed costs of exporting are at the product level but not at the …rm level. The reason why a …rm chooses to export if and only if its organizational e¢ ciency is su¢ ciently large is that a …rm with greater organizational e¢ ciency optimally chooses to have lower marginal cost (as we have already seen in the closed economy case), thus allowing the …rm to make a su¢ ciently high gross pro…t per product abroad to cover the one-time product-level …xed cost of exporting. As we discuss in the next subsection, N ( ; K) is discontinuous at = x : the number of products managed by a non-exporter with organizational e¢ ciency just below x is discretely larger than that managed by an exporter with organizational e¢ ciency just above x . By doing so, an exporter saves on the product-level export cost and sells more units per product at lower marginal cost.
Given that a …rm either exports all of its products or none, its per-period pro…t (having sunk the entry, product development and export costs) can be written as
The free entry condition is again given by
where the value v e ( ; K) of a new entrant of type ( ; K) now accounts for the fact that a new entrant may choose to become an exporter:
The labor market clearing condition in the open economy is given by
where the second equality follows from the fact that
As in the closed economy case, the equilibrium mass M of entrants is thus proportional to the size of the economy, L. 
Cross-Sectional Correlations in Firm Performance Measures
We now turn to the key …rm performance measures and their cross-sectional correlations.
Inserting (24) into (17), we obtain marginal cost (the inverse of TFP) as a function of …rm type:
As in the closed economy case, the marginal cost of the …rm is independent of K, and strictly decreasing in for all > . However, mirroring our earlier observation that N ( ; K) drops discretely with an increase in at the export threshold = x , marginal cost is discontinuous at = x . A …rm with organizational e¢ ciency = x is indi¤erent between exporting and selling only domestically. If it chooses to export, the …rm optimally increases the TFP of its production processes by focusing its organizational capital on fewer products. The opportunity cost of becoming productive enough to export is the reduction in domestic pro…ts due to the reduced product range.
Inserting (24) into (25), we obtain the per-period pro…t of a …rm of type ( ; K):
As in the closed economy case, the …rm's sales are proportional to its per-period pro…t:
From (30) and (31), it follows that per-period pro…t and sales are discontinuous in at the export cuto¤ x , jumping up as the number of products managed drops. 7 As before, the …rm's market value is v( ; K) = ( ; K)=(1 ) whereas its book value is the replacement cost of its tangible assets that it previously accumulated for entry, product development and export distribution:
The …rm's value of Tobin's Q, which is the ratio of the two, is thus given by 7 To see this, note that ln lim # x S( ; K) lim " x S( ; K) = ln(1 + ) + 1
where we have used the de…nition of x to establish the last equality.
where N ( ; K) is given by (24).
As the following proposition shows, our result on the diversi…cation discount (holding …rm size …xed) carries over the open economy setting:
Proposition 5 Consider two …rms of di¤erent types, ( ; K) and ( 0 ; K 0 ), with the same level of sales, S( ; K) = S( 0 ; K 0 ). Then, the …rm that produces the larger number of products will have a lower market-to-book ratio:
That is, when controlling for …rm size, there is a diversi…cation discount in the equilibrium of the open economy.
The E¤ects of Globalization on Firm Performance
We now explore the e¤ects of a reduction in the iceberg-type trade cost (and thus of an increase in the trade freeness parameter ) on …rms' decisions and the resulting impact on …rm performance measures. We con…ne attention to changes that are small enough to preserve the parameter restriction (21). (In the following, we will index postliberalization variables by a prime.)
The following lemma shows how trade liberalization a¤ects the e¤ective market size for exporters and non-exporters.
Lemma 3 Consider an increase in trade freeness from to 0 > . This lowers the e¤ective market size facing non-exporters, i.e., 0 < , and raises the e¤ective market size facing exporters, i.e.,
An immediate implication of the lemma is that trade liberalization results in an increase in welfare by inducing a lower price index (or, equivalently, an increase in the markup-adjusted residual demand level). The lemma also makes clear that a fall in trade costs reduces the e¤ective market size facing …rms that do not export while raising the e¤ective market size of exporting …rms. As exporting becomes more attractive and the domestic market less attractive, the cuto¤s for maximal diversi…cation and exporting change, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 6
Consider an increase in trade freeness from to 0 > . This induces the thresholds for exporting and for maximal diversi…cation to fall: x0 < x and 0 < .
Proof. Equation (23) immediately implies that x0 < x . Lemma 1, which establishes that 0 < , and the fact that ( 1)= is increasing in , imply that 0 < .
As in Melitz (2003) , an increase in the freeness of trade lowers the (organizational) e¢ ciency threshold above which a …rm selects into exporting: Following a trade liberalization, any …rm ( ; K) with 2 ( x0 ; x ) will switch from non-exporting to exporting. In our setting, there is also another form of selection. As the e¤ective size of the domestic market becomes smaller, due to a reduction in trade costs for foreign …rms, the threshold above which …rms opt to be less than maximally diversi…ed falls as well.
The next proposition formally considers how the choice of …rm scope is a¤ected by a trade liberalization.
Proposition 7
Consider an increase in trade freeness from to 0 > . This causes …rms that initially sold only domestically to drop products, i.e., N ( ; K)
for all 2 (0; x ), with a strict inequality if 2 ( 0 ; x ), and all continuing exporters to increase the number of products they manage, i.e., N ( ; K) 0 > N ( ; K) for all 2 ( x ; 1).
Trade liberalization causes …rms that do not export prior to the trade shock to drop product lines. This e¤ect is especially strong for …rms that are induced by the trade liberalization to switch to exporting because an exporter optimally wants to be "leaner and meaner,"as discussed before. On the other hand, for continuing exporters the trade shock results in a larger e¤ective market size to which they respond by adding more products. These results suggest systematic and asymmetric changes in …rms'marginal costs, which the following corollary substantiates. Proof. This follows directly from the de…nition of marginal cost (the inverse of TFP) and Proposition 7.
The changes in the number of product lines managed by …rms of di¤erent types implies a particular productivity e¤ect that varies across …rms. Those non-exporters that choose to drop products experience an increase in their TFP as these …rms become "leaner and meaner." Those …rms that switch to become exporters after the reduction in trade costs also see their TFP rise: as they face the …rst-order e¤ect associated with paying the additional …xed cost f x per product, they choose to become "leaner and meaner," too. Finally, continuing exporters see their TFP fall as they adjust to an e¤ectively larger market by expanding their product scope.
To complete our analysis, the following proposition considers how a trade liberalization a¤ects Tobin's Q across …rms.
Proposition 8
Consider an increase in trade freeness from to 0 > . There exists a threshold value of organizational e¢ ciency, b 2 ( x0 ; x ), such that any …rm ( ; K) with organizational e¢ ciency below that threshold experiences a reduction in their market-tobook ratio, i.e., Q( ; K) 0 < Q( ; K) if < b , while the opposite holds for any other …rm,
Proof. See Appendix. 
Numerical Example
To further elaborate on the model's implications, we explore a numerical example. We discipline the choice of parameters in our example by matching three well known facts about the distribution of …rm performance measures. Holding …xed this parameterization, the model implies a rich set of cross-sectional correlations in other …rm performance measures that are consistent with the sign of the correlations found in the empirical literature. 8 We also consider the comparative static of a 10 percent multilateral decrease in iceberg trade costs and show that the model implies heterogeneous responses across …rms that are also consistent with recent empirical work.
To implement our numerical example, we approximate the continuous distribution function G by drawing 10,000 times a pair ( ; K) from a Gumbel copula with Pareto marginals for K and Power marginals for . Given an initial guess of the mass of entrants, M , we allow …rms to choose the number of their products and their export status and then calculate their pro…ts as a function of their type and M . Adjusting M if average realized pro…ts are non-zero, we iterate until the free entry condition holds. We choose the distributional parameters and the export costs so that the following empirical observations hold in the numerical example: (i) the size distribution of …rms is consistent with Zipf's law, (ii) 20% of …rms export, and (iii) conditional on exporting, a …rm's export 8 We view our numerical exercise as illustrative of the kinds of correlations the model can generate rather than as a calibration exercise. The latter would require a more formal modeling of country asymmetries that is outside the scope of the present paper.
sales are roughly 15% of its total revenue. 9 Finally, we choose the sunk entry cost relative to the sunk cost of opening a plant so that most …rms are not maximally diversi…ed. 10 We …rst discuss the parameterized model's implications for the relationship between size, TFP, and export status. The results are shown in Figure 1 , where the logarithm of …rm size for non-exporters (shown as dark triangles) and exporters (shown as light Xs)
is plotted against the logarithm of …rm TFP.
The model is consistent with several well-documented features of the data. Turning to …nancial performance measures, Figure 2 shows the simulated relationship between the logarithm of Tobin's Q for non-exporters (depicted as dark triangles) and exporters (depicted as light Xs) and the logarithm of TFP. Consistent with the results of Schoar (2002) , …rms that display high levels of TFP tend to have higher levels of Tobin's Q. Note, however, that for a given level of TFP there is substantial heterogeneity in 9 Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) report in the appendix to their paper that 20% of manufacturing …rms export and that the share of their exports in total revenue is 15%. 10 The parameter values chosen in the simulation are as follows. Without loss of generality, we set = 0. To be consistent with a 25% mark-up we set = 5. We set the …xed cost of opening a plant to f = 4 and the trade costs to f x = 1:5 and = 1:5. We assume that all of the entry cost is spent on tangible assets, i.e., F e = F , and choose this cost to be F = 30, and the population size to be L = 300. Turning to distributional parameters, the Gumbel dependence parameter is set to 4, the Pareto marginals for K have a shape parameter of 1.05, and the Power distribution for has a shape parameter of 0.25. Note that this choice of parameters satis…es condition (21). In the data, there is a positive link between the number of products a …rm manages and its aggregate sales and the likelihood that the …rm exports Schott, 2006 and 2007) . The relationship between these …rm performance measures in our numerical example is shown in Figure 3 . There is a striking correlation between the number of products a …rm manages and its aggregate sales. Less obvious from the …gure is that the correlation between the logarithm of the number of products a …rm manages and the logarithm of sales per product is also positive (0.36). Further, the simulation results indicate that although there is substantial overlap between the number of products managed by exporters and non-exporters, on average exporters manage 45% more products than …rms that do not export. Both of these implications are consistent with the data. A substantial empirical literature has developed in the last ten years that documents the impact both at the industry level and the …rm level of a reduction in global trading costs. We conclude this section by comparing two equilibria that di¤er only in the size of trade costs. In particular, we consider how the number of products managed by …rms and the TFP of those …rms change when trade costs are reduced by 10%. Table 1 reports the average fractional changes in the number of products managed (…rst row) and TFP (second row) that are induced by the trade liberalization. These induced changes are computed for three groups of …rms. The …rst column shows the average fractional changes across all …rms. The second row shows the average fractional changes for …rms that do not export prior to the trade liberalization but choose to export thereafter, whereas the third column reports the average fractional changes for …rms that never export.
The results of our comparative static are broadly consistent with those found in the empirical literature. As documented by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011), a and exporters (Xs).
Change in All Firms Switchers Never Export
Number of Products -18% -34% -21% TFP +0.5% +4.3% 0.4% Table 1: The table shows In particular, …rms that remained non-exporters even after the trade liberalization experienced modest or no productivity changes while …rms that switched to exporting experienced very substantial improvements in TFP. As illustrated in Table 1 , our model generates heterogeneous responses across …rms similar to those found in the data. Comparing columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 , we see that those …rms that are induced to export Note that the positive link between the change in the number of products managed and the change in measured TFP illustrated in Table 1 is also consistent with existing empirics. Schoar (2002) shows that an increase in the level of diversi…cation of U.S. …rms tends to be associated with a reduction in the TFP of incumbent plants. Our model produces exactly such a relationship when an external shock, such as a change in trade costs, induces …rms to alter their scope.
Conclusion
We developed an international trade model with multiproduct …rms. In the model, …rms are heterogeneously endowed with a stock of organizational capital and the e¢ ciency with which organizational capital can be used to reduce marginal cost. This gives rise to a trade-o¤ between focusing on managing few products at low marginal cost and many products at high marginal cost. Depending on their endowment, di¤erent …rms solve this tradeo¤ di¤erently. To make our analysis as transparent as possible, we simpli…ed along several dimensions. For instance, we treated all products as being perfectly symmetric. Allowing for heterogeneity across products would allow for richer resource allocation issues to arise within the …rm. Moreover, we have kept the analysis static, assuming that endowments of organizational capital are randomly assigned to …rms, thereby avoiding the analysis of the accumulation of organizational capital within the …rm. We leave this for future research.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let I denote the …rm's set of products. Conditional on having incurred the irrecoverable development cost for its N = #I products, the …rm optimally allocates its organizational capital so as to maximize the sum of its future pro…ts:
Note that the objective function is increasing and concave in the k ! 's. For a given set I of products, it is thus optimal for the …rm to exhaust all of its endowment of organizational capital (i.e., set P !2I k ! = K) and, for each ! 2 I, to choose either k ! = k 1 or k ! = 0. However, it cannot be optimal to chose a set I of products and then allocate k ! = 0 to some product ! 2 I (resulting in in…nite marginal cost for that product); in that case, the …rm would have increased its pro…t by choosing not to develop that good and saving development cost f . Hence, a …rm of type ( ; K) chooses to manage no more than K products, N ( ; K) K, and sets k ! = K=N ( ; K) for each one of its N ( ; K)
products.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let e N ( ; K) denote the solution to the …rst-order condition of program (7), i.e.,
Note that e N ( ; K) > 0 for all ( ; K) 2 ; that is, each entrant chooses to be active.
By Lemma 1, the solution to the …rst-order condition, e N ( ; K), is the solution to the problem of pro…t maximization only if e N ( ; K) K. The value-maximizing number of products is thus given by
Next, we show that e N ( ; K) is strictly decreasing in . Taking the partial derivative of e N ( ; K) with respect to , and dividing by K, we obtain
where 
where ( 1)= is such that e N ( ; K) = K.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The assertion on the relationship between marginal cost and follows directly from (13) . To see that S( ; K( )) is increasing in for all 2 (0; 1), consider equation (12) .
Note …rst that @S( ; K)=@ = 0 and @S( ; K)=@K > 0 for 2 (0; ). So, ( ) > 0 implies that S( ; K( )) is increasing in for 2 (0; ). For 2 ( ; 1) we have:
which is strictly positive if and only if (16) holds. To see that Q( ; K( )) is increasing in for all 2 (0; 1), consider equation (15) . Note …rst that @Q( ; K)=@ = 0 and @Q( ; K)=@K > 0 for 2 (0; ). So, ( ) > 0 implies that Q( ; K( )) is increasing in for 2 (0; ). For 2 ( ; 1) we have:
which is strictly positive if and only if
where ( ) is as de…ned in (16) . Hence, ( ) > ( ) implies that Q( ; K( )) is increasing in for 2 ( ; 1).
Proof of Proposition 3. First, consider two …rms, ( 0 ; K 0 ) and ( 00 ; K 00 ), that share the same degree of diversi…cation, N ( Proof of Lemma 2. Let I denote the …rm's set of products. Conditional on having incurred the irrecoverable development cost for its N = #I products, and given its choice of which product(s) to export (if any), the …rm optimally allocates its organizational capital so as to maximize the sum of its future pro…ts:
is a measure of trade freeness, (!) = 1 if the …rm chooses to export product !, and (!) = 0 otherwise. Note that the objective function is increasing and concave in k ! for k ! 1 but independent of k ! for k ! < 1. For a given set I of products, it is thus optimal for the …rm to exhaust all of its endowment of organizational capital (i.e., set P !2I k ! = K) and, for each ! 2 I, to choose k ! 2 f0; k x g with k
However, it cannot be optimal to chose a set I of products and then allocate k ! = 0 to some product ! 2 I (resulting in in…nite marginal cost for that product); in that case, the …rm would have increased its pro…t by choosing not to develop that good and saving development cost f (as well as f x if (!) = 1). Hence, a …rm of type ( ; K) chooses to manage no more than K products,
The Lagrangian associated with the …rm's stage-2 decisions can thus be written as
where is the share of exported products, and the Lagrange multiplier on the …rm's organizational capital constraint. As the Lagrangian is linear in , it is optimal for the …rm to set 2 f0; 1g, i.e., to export either all of its products or none.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose …rst that the …rm chooses not to export,
so that program (20) simpli…es to (7). As we have seen in Section 3.1, the solution to
1= g and the resulting expected sum of future pro…ts (net of product development costs)
where the …rst argument on the RHS is positive by (21).Next, suppose that the …rm chooses to export, x = 1, so that program (20) becomes
From the …rst-order condition, "
and the constraint N K, we obtain the solution to this program:
The resulting expected sum of future pro…ts (net of the product development and export costs) is As x= ln x is increasing in x for x > 1, condition (21) implies that the …rst argument in the max-function is negative. Hence, v x ( ; K) simpli…es to v x ( ; K) = Kf 1 + 1 + f x =f (1 )
The …rm optimally chooses not to export, Equations (22) and (24) follow.
Proof of Proposition 5. For two …rms that are either both exporters (minf ; 0 g > x )
or both non-exporters (maxf ; 0 g < x ), the argument in the proof of Proposition 3 carries over to the open economy case. What still needs to be shown is that the result obtains for an exporting …rm with > x when compared to a non-exporting …rm for which 0 < x . From the expression for Tobin's Q in (32), we have
As the two …rms have the same sales level, S( ; K) = S( 0 ; K 0 ), by assumption, equation where the inequality follows from Lemma 3 and the parameter restriction (21).
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider …rst a …rm ( ; K) with 2 (0; 0 ). From equation (32) and the fact that 0 < by Lemma 3, it follows immediately that Q( ; K) 0 < Q( ; K)
for such a …rm.
Consider now a …rm ( ; K) with 2 ( 0 ; ). From (32) and (24), the ratio between 
